TIME: Almanac 1993/TIME Almanac 1993.iso/time/123091/1230002.000

Text File | 1992-08-28 | 5.4 KB | 116 lines

                                                                                WORLD, Page 29

YUGOSLAVIA

The Shock of Recognition


Germany pressures its European partners into a compromise on
independence for Croatia and Slovenia

By FREDERICK PAINTON -- Reported by James L. Graff/Zagreb,
James O. Jackson/Bonn and William Mader/London


    It used to be a given of European political life that
Germany, guilt-ridden by its wartime past, would not take a
leading or controversial role in world affairs. The Federal
Republic, it was said, was an economic giant and a political
dwarf -- a state of affairs that suited its neighbors very well
indeed. Last week the dwarf suddenly raised himself to
unprecedented heights during a tense debate within the European
Community on how to deal with the six-month-old civil war in
Yugoslavia.

    Only a week after the Maastricht summit, hailed as a major
step toward E.C. unity, the Twelve found themselves deeply
divided over whether to recognize the independence of the
breakaway republics of Slovenia and Croatia in the face of
continuing attacks by the Serb-dominated national army. On the
eve of an E.C. foreign ministers' meeting in Brussels, the
Germans were in a distinct minority in their push for
recognition -- a move they said would deter further Serbian
assaults. By the next day, in an unexpected show of diplomatic
muscle, Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher had cajoled and
bullied the European partners into partial agreement by
threatening that Germany would act alone if they failed to go
along.

    The result was a compromise: the E.C. would recognize the
two republics as of Jan. 15, but only if they pledged to
respect human and minority rights, demonstrated a willingness
to settle border questions and other disputes peacefully, and
guaranteed a democratic government. The Germans immediately
undermined the decision, however, by declaring their intention
to recognize Croatia and Slovenia even before the E.C. makes a
determination on whether the conditions have been met.

    Chancellor Helmut Kohl called the compromise "a great
victory for German foreign policy." At the least, it spared the
E.C. from an embarrassing public split, but there will
undoubtedly be unpleasant repercussions for some time to come.
British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd, evoking World War I,
reminded the House of Commons that "there is a tradition of the
main states of Western Europe splitting in rivalry on these
Balkan questions, and this all ending up on the battlefield. I
don't think that tradition is a good one." One Conservative M.P.
even complained about "the overmighty Hun."

    Rarely since the end of World War II has a foreign policy
issue had such an emotional impact on the German government and
public as the crisis in Yugoslavia. One explanation for the
strong German support of Croatia is that German unification in
1990 flowed from the very self-determination that Slovenes and
Croats are now attempting to exercise. Another is that Germany
has a built-in lobby in nearly 500,000 Croats living in the
country. Millions of German tourists, moreover, have long
enjoyed the Croatian coast as a kind of central European
Riviera.

    Backed halfheartedly by Belgium and Denmark, Germany
argued for recognition of the two republics as quickly as
possible, suggesting that international acceptance of Croatia's
frontiers would deflect the Serbian drive to annex more Croatian
territory on the pretext of protecting Serb minorities. But
opponents in Britain, France, Holland and, from the sidelines,
the U.S. and the United Nations countered that recognition might
only provoke the Serbs into expanding the civil war by
deploying the national army into Bosnia-Herzegovina to "protect"
the Serb minority there. That in turn could cause the conflict
to spread to Macedonia, possibly involving Greece; to Kosovo,
which has an Albanian majority; even to Hungary, which has a
minority ethnic community just across the border with
Yugoslavia. Most Croats are also convinced that recognition
would allow them to receive better arms from the West,
strengthening their resistance.

    "E.C. policy is now German policy," commented Belgrade's
state-run TV, repeating the official Serbian accusation that the
Germany of today is a reincarnation of Hitler's Third Reich,
which, in a new march to conquest, is trying to break up
Yugoslavia. "The main problem with recognition," said Wolfgang
Biermann, a foreign policy analyst for the Social Democrats in
Bonn, "is that it is the Germans who are pushing it. Considering
Germany's history in Yugoslavia, the Serbs are convinced that
Germany is splitting up their state again. That escalates the
conflict." In a number of capitals there was discomfort with the
appearance of Germany again supporting Croatian independence,
as the Nazis backed fascist Croatia during World War II.

    For the moment, the war appears to be beyond the reach of
diplomacy: so long as cease-fires cannot be guaranteed, no U.N.
or E.C. intervention force is likely to be inserted between the
warring factions. The search for a peaceful solution amounts to
one of the greatest diplomatic challenges the E.C. has faced
since its inception. Germany, derided as a slacker by some
allies during the gulf war, has now stepped out in front. But
who knows whether its initiative will help solve what may be an
intractable problem?